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Abstract: The article examines the movement of grassroots organizations and volunteers in Hungary that 
suddenly emerged during the European migration and refugee crisis in 2015. This movement emerged in a 
society with low level of trust and high level of xenophobia, without any relevant previous examples. This 
movement was built from scratch via Facebook groups and provided humanitarian aid for the refugees and 
migrants on streets and railway stations of major cities in Hungary as a response to the lack of sufficient aid 
by the official relief organizations and the state. The analysis is based on various qualitative data sources and 
covers the motivational structure of the volunteers and grassroots organizations, their operational methods, 
including the nature of cooperation and conflicts that emerged during relief work. In addition, the article 
also deals with the attitudes and (the lack of) activity of the established charities and other NGOs. The study 
reflects on the political context and the public debates and also analyses the role of online and social media 
during the migration crisis, focusing on the summer and fall of 2015.
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Introduction
The year 2015 was a turning point in the refugee and migrant crisis,1 both in Europe and 
in Hungary. Although in recent years there had been a marked increase in the number 
of registered asylum-seekers in Hungary, in 2015 the highest number of refugees 
and migrants reached Hungary’s borders since World War II. Within a year, about 
390,000 people passed through the country, of which only 177,000 were registered as 
asylum-seekers by the authorities. The great majority of this heterogeneous migrant 
1 In this paper we use various terms for the people who travelled through Hungary as part of the flow of migration in 2015. 
Besides the general umbrella term ‘migrants’, we also use the terms ‘asylum-seekers’ (which is legally applicable to migrants 
who started their asylum applications) and ‘refugees’ (the latter is technically a legally inaccurate term, but one often used in 
both the Hungarian and European public discourse and media with respect to the individuals involved).
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population did not consider Hungary to be their destination country, but only a transit 
country on the way to their final destinations in Western Europe (primarily Germany 
and Sweden). Countries along the Western Balkan migration route were faced with an 
ever-increasing number of migrants. As they established direct contact with the local 
population, volunteers began providing assistance in multiple countries and cities, 
including Hungary. The relief work largely relied on the activities of civil volunteers 
and grassroots organizations that popped up unexpectedly across the country at the 
beginning of the migration crisis, especially in cities where the masses of asylum-
seekers and migrants spent several days while waiting before continuing their journey 
to their target countries.
Despite the existence of enthusiastic volunteers and grassroots organisations, the 
Hungarian population in general can be described as highly xenophobic (Sik, 2016) 
with a low level of trust in general (Tóth, 2009; Boda & Medve-Bálint, 2012; TÁRKI, 
2013) and a tendency to demonstrate exclusionary behaviour towards marginalised 
groups (e.g. various nationalities, ethnicities, religions or lifestyles). According to 
self-reported responses collected through quantitative research, 3 percent of the 
Hungarian adult population participated in refugee relief work or made donations 
during the summer of 2015, and 7 percent claimed to have a friend or an acquaintance 
that participated (Bernát-Sik-Simonovits-Szeitl, 2015). At the time around 5 percent 
of the population could be considered xenophiles, which group could overlap 
significantly with those that volunteered. However, such a large scale civil activity 
was rare in the last decade and considering its target group, it may even have been 
unprecedented, therefore we believed it to be worth being studied.  
Research conducted in the autumn and winter of 2015 by the TARKI Social 
Research Institute (Simonovits-Bernát ed. 2016) explores the contradictions of this 
phenomenon: how new forms of civil activity emerged in a society that, in general, 
demonstrates a low level of solidarity towards ‘strangers’ and ‘others’ and which can 
be characterized by a lack of trust. How is it possible that in a society with such a 
restricted set of values and a tendency to deny the rights of ‘others’ and disparage 
diversity sprung up a dedicated and effective voluntary movement without an 
organizational history such as that of established charity organizations? The research 
also covered various pre-existing agencies, typically large relief organisations and 
NGOs, that were already actively helping refugees and immigrants and engaging in 
aid activity. 
Based on the above-described research, our study presents and analyses the 
motivations and attitudes of volunteers and their grassroots organizations, as well as 
the established charities which helped migrants during the 2015 Hungarian migrant 
crisis.2 Our study is based on individual interviews and focus groups with individuals 
who volunteered (see Table A1 in the Annex for more details). 
2 This paper focuses only on the events of 2015 and does not deal with the events of 2016 and their effects.
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The organizations that actively took part in the relief work can be classified into 
four main groups: (1) established charity or aid organizations; (2) NGOs with a 
mission linked directly or indirectly to asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants; (3) 
brand new volunteer-based, self-organised grassroots groups; and (4) international 
organizations (for more background information about the organizations analysed 
in this study, see Bernát, 2016). Analysis of these organizations is primarily based on 
the interviews and focus groups carried out with the leaders or prominent members 
of these organizations between October 2015 and January 2016 (see Table A2 in 
the Annex), and almost all findings are restricted to those organizations that shared 
their opinions and experiences with us, while opinions about other organizations’ 
activities are articulated only in a few cases and are based on interviews with other 
organizations or other sources. In addition to the interviews, we used other relevant 
sources of information in the analysis such as relevant online and social media 
content (Barta and Tóth 2016) and public lectures and discussions with leaders of 
organizations that supported the refugee crisis (see Table A3 in Annex).
The paper first briefly summarizes the social and political context of the migrant 
crisis in 2015. It then describes the evolution of the newly established grassroots 
organizations. After this, the motivations of aid organizations and individuals are 
analysed, and the typical manifestations of cooperation and conflict between domestic 
organizations and associations are described. Finally, we discuss the essential role 
that the media played during this period. 
The social and political context of the refugee relief work 
The evolution of the organisations that helped the migrants during this period 
(including grassroots and traditional aid organizations) and the role of volunteers are 
embedded in the national and local socio-political context. Accordingly, it is essential 
to provide a brief overview of the events related to the 2015 migrant crisis.
EU leadership figures engaged in a so-called “refugee welcoming” rhetoric, but 
their actual responses to events was indecisive. It is not only outsiders’ critique but 
was also the opinion of some EU bodies.3 While most of the Western European EU 
states expressed their support towards migrants in general, Germany, the migrants’ 
primary destination country, emphasized this message the strongest. The Hungarian 
government’s strong anti-immigration rhetoric was almost unique; a message which 
the majority of the European leaders condemned. The first milestone may have been 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s statement at the commemoration of the 
victims of the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015; namely, that 
economic immigration should be curbed because immigrants “can only bring trouble 
3 Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
published the following statement on 09/09/2015: „The present crisis has clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of the current 
political and institutional instruments and procedures including the Dublin Regulation on which the asylum policies of the 
European Union are based” http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=5759&lang=2&cat=
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to Europe”.4 The statement raised a great deal of attention both in Hungary and in 
Europe and was followed by an anti-immigration government campaign in the spring 
of 2015 along with a “National Consultation on Immigration”5 and a subsequent, 
country-wide billboard campaign. The democratic opposition (the left and the green 
parties) were unable to respond to the situation meaningfully, while the extreme 
right-wing opposition lost ground as the government’s communication expressed an 
anti-immigration message.
Neither state institutions nor official charity organisations provided sufficient 
humanitarian aid to the migrants crossing the country, so in response to the general 
passivity individual volunteers and new volunteer-based grassroots organisations 
started to emerge. Moreover, some general public services, such as some of the public 
transportation companies or the public sanitation services were also unprepared for 
this challenge that made relief work even more difficult.
It must be noted that, in addition to the above-mentioned factors, the new 
civilian volunteers and their organizations emerged from an inherently anti-refugee 
(Sik, 2016) and confidence-deficient country (TÁRKI, 2013). Moreover, Hungary 
last faced large-scale migration two decades earlier in the form of ethnic Hungarians 
from Transylvania, and asylum-seekers (many of them also ethnic Hungarians) from 
the war zones of Yugoslavia. The rise in the number of migrants was unprecedented 
in Hungary (and also Europe) in terms of the order of magnitude, composition and 
processes. Although governments had information about migrants heading towards 
Europe, they may have underestimated their number, their effect on new migrants 
and on human trafficking. 
One of the most important feature of the refugee crisis was the use of new 
internet-based technologies. Facebook and other social media platforms played an 
essential role in facilitating the exchange of information between individuals and 
the organization of group activities. In addition, call and chat software programs and 
other information applications directly targeted migrants, while electronic maps and 
other practical applications created radically different opportunities compared to 
those available during previous waves of migration. All this was complemented by the 
intense presence of commercial and public media (television, radio, online and print 
media) which simultaneously shaped public opinion and events, and whose influence 
was also determining. 
4 Orban: We do not accept economic migrants as refugees (Orbán: Gazdasági bevándorlóknak nem adunk menedéket , Index.
hu, 11/01/2015): http://index.hu/belfold/2015/01/11/orban_gazdasagi_bevandorloknak_nem_adunk_menedeket/
5 The Hungarian Government put together a questionnaire with twelve questions which was sent to every voter as part of a 
national consultation concerning immigration, economic immigration and terrorism. The official reason for canvassing the 
opinion of voters was that “a change in the Government’s immigration policy requires wider social support”. (Source: official 
website of the Hungarian Government on 24 April 2015: http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/national-
consultation-on-immigration-to-begin)
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Theoretical framework
The aim of our explorative qualitative study is to foster understanding of how new 
forms of solidarity with migrants emerged in a society characterised by a high level of 
xenophobia and low levels of trust and civic involvement. The article examines some 
more of the related issues in depth, including what motivated volunteers to join the 
aid work, what challenges and conflicts organisations and individuals faced because 
of their involvement (or absence), and, finally, whether this humanitarian action may 
led to new forms of long-lasting civic commitment.
Solidarity and factors leading to the weakness of civil society
One of the initial questions addressed by the research is how this civil activity arose in 
a generally weak and passive civil society. Social solidarity is a key concept in various 
fields of social sciences from political sociology to social psychology or historical 
sociology (Moody & White, 2003). Therefore our original approach on solidarity 
is probably the closest to the theories of political sociology which focus on how 
solidarity among citizens builds social cohesion and how it affects the construction of 
civil societies and thus democracies (Putnam, 2000; Paxton, 1999). 
In the case of Hungary, the civil society’s weakness is well known among 
researchers, and it has been observed in several areas, from low civic involvement and 
participation (Hoskins et al, 2006) to the number of volunteers (KSH, 2012) or the 
highly apolitical behaviour of youth (Oross, 2012). 
One factor that has weakened civil society is the lack of a connection between 
“civil” and “political” fields. Based on Arató and Cohen’s model of civil society/the 
public sphere (Cohen & Arató, 1992), Gerő and Kopper found that, instead of a 
cooperative link between the political and civil field in Hungary, there is a need to 
strictly separate the two arenas. This led to what they call the “fake civil” discourse 
that made the relationship between the two spheres impossible, and the emergence 
of claims that the two should remain completely separate (Gerő & Kopper, 2011). 
This concept might originate from the transition period. During the democratization 
period of Central and Eastern Europe, the relationship between civil society and 
state was often seen as oppositional, hindering later cooperation between the two 
spheres (Howard, 2003). 
Numerous pieces of research (Howard, 2003; Tóth, 2009; Sík & Giczi, 2009 etc.) 
have claimed that the weakness of Hungarian civil society is deeply rooted in the 
society’s lack of general and institutional trust. In contrast to this, some researchers 
in the USA found no relationship between interpersonal or institutional trust and 
volunteering. Some findings even suggest that a lack of trust in others is what 
motivates people to engage in collective action (Oliver, 1984). This conclusion agrees 
with a study of the motivation of Hungarian volunteers which found that feeling of 
deception following the failure of institutions is one of the key drivers of volunteer 
engagement in social activities (Bartal & Kmetty, 2011). 
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Even though theories of solidarity, civil society, or trust could be discussed at 
length, this article focuses on whether the above-mentioned weakening factors 
appeared or played any role during the civilian relief work of the 2015 refugee crisis 
in Hungary.
Volunteerism and activism in the framework of the refugee crisis
Participants of newly emergent grassroots groups mostly referred to themselves as 
volunteers. In this study, the term volunteering is used to refer to any activity in which 
time is given freely, without financial reimbursement, for the purpose of benefiting 
another person, group, organisation or the common good (Wilson, 2000; Czike & 
Bartal, 2006). Volunteering may take many forms and be inspired by various sets of 
values. It occurs both in institutional and informal frameworks (Wilson, 2000). 
Even though the grassroots groups certainly meet the above-defined criteria 
of volunteerism, their members have often been framed as social activists because 
of the highly politicized context of the refugee crisis in 2015. A Hungarian study 
conducted among members of the same self-organised grassroots groups that we 
investigated came to the conclusion that these volunteers were, in fact, social change 
activists who found volunteerism the most suitable vehicle for the expression of 
their emotions and political dissent (Kende, 2016). As volunteerism and social 
activism have many attributes in common, some researchers claim that there is 
no valid sociological reason for studying them in different ways (Marwell & Oliver, 
1995). The motivation that leads to participation in this kind of work is similar with 
volunteerism and activism: an individual’s socialisation, self-concept, values, self-
protective attitudes, and the need for status, social recognition or social interaction 
(Horton-Smith, 1981; Batson et al., 1983; Borshuk, 2004; Clary et al., 1998; Esmond 
& Dunlop, 2004). Identity-based models assume that action is motivated either by a 
disadvantaged identity or a feeling of solidarity with disadvantaged groups, and that 
these identities undergo a process of identity politicization (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001). Considering demographic attributes, it is mainly better educated members 
of the middle class who possess a wide range of resources and free time who join in 
both types of collective action (Wilson, 2000), although women are overrepresented 
in humanitarian work, while men and younger people are more likely to join activist 
groups or movements. 
As for the Hungarian volunteers, Bartal and Kmetty found that values, social 
recognition and social interaction were the three main factors which motivated 
individuals to participate in volunteer work (Bartal & Kmetty, 2011). In an earlier 
piece of research, Czike and Bartal identified two main motivational structures among 
Hungarian volunteers: one traditional, and another the authors call a “new type” of 
volunteering. Within the frame of the traditional motivational structure volunteers 
desire to help those in need based on their (often religious) convictions; married, 
middle-aged women mainly belong in this category. New forms of volunteering are 
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more based on personal drivers such as the desire to develop a career or build a social 
network and are typical of the younger generation in need of professional experience 
(Czike & Bartal, 2006). 
The above-listed motivational factors and demographic attributes increase the 
chance of involvement, but the best predictor of both types of involvement is former 
volunteering or activist experience (Damico et al., 1998; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; 
Bartal, 2010) and those who belong to formal or informal groups are more likely to 
devote their time to good causes (Putnam, 2000). 
A slight distinction can be made between the two types of actors in that social 
activists are oriented towards social change, while volunteers focus more on individual 
problems and often do not wish to disturb the status quo (Markham & Bonjean, 1995; 
Snyder & Omoto, 2008). To put it simply, volunteers tend to “care about people, not 
politics” and therefore often deny the political nature of their activities (Eliasoph, 
1998). In political situations adverse to their cause, volunteers may engage in activist 
strategies in order to spread their messages or mobilise resources (Chambre, 1991), 
while for activists volunteerism might function as a tool in the service of a cause 
(Kende, 2016). 
In order to incorporate both formal and informal types of relief work in the analysis, 
we refer to both members of official organisations and grassroots ones as volunteers. 
However, considering the possible influence of the highly politicised context of 
the refugee crisis, we did not exclude the possibility of activist strategies or self-
identification. 
The role of social media
As more and more groups and movements are organised online, the role of social 
media inevitably becomes the subject of scientific interest. Numerous movements 
are conceptualized as having been given life through social media; Wael Ghonim 
even called the events of the Arab Spring “Revolution 2.0”, referring to the crucial 
importance of social media (Castells, 2012; Fuchs, 2014). According to Castells, 
in terms of political communication social networking sites function as “counter-
power” to the official channels of communication in which opposition points of 
view have less chance of being expressed because of political power relations, 
and therefore social media can serve as a base for further real-life political 
action (Castells, 2012). Critics of this positive approach label the political action 
undertaken on social media “slacktivism”, “clicktivism” or “feel-good online 
activism” which they claim has little-to-no effect on real-life events (Morozov, 
2010; Fuchs, 2014). 
Newly formed grassroots organisations clearly acted as a counter-power to 
government policies, but in the case of media use they were unable to dominate the 
field of communication. Media content analysis shows that, even though the new 
grassroots initiatives used social media frequently and quite successfully to spread 
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their messages and mobilise resources, most of their content was framed by official 
governmental communication which lead to a reactive strategy of communications 
that failed to create an independent narrative (Barta & Tóth, 2016; Messing & 
Bernát, 2016). Dessewffy and Nagy suggest that the main characteristics of one of 
the newly formed Facebook groups (Migration Aid - MA) is its “rhizomatic structure” 
and function as an “information thermostat,” and it can therefore be described as an 
example of “connective action” (Dessewffy & Nagy, 2015) which refers to a new type 
of collective action based on social networking sites. 
Regarding the social media, this study focuses on how volunteers themselves 
perceived the role of social media during their work, from the beginning of their 
involvement to the end of the main phase of relief work (after the locking down of the 
Serbian and Croatian borders in October 2015). 
The evolution of grassroots organisations 
In the early summer of 2015, a number of new, volunteer-based grassroots 
organisations emerged with the goal of providing humanitarian aid to migrants. 
In a surprisingly short span of time they managed to formulate a wide agenda 
and significantly raise public awareness and obtain influence. The role and weight 
of these grassroots organisations in public life was widely magnified in an already 
highly politicised atmosphere as their activities (which until then had been more 
traditionally conducted by the state or larger established civilian or ecclesiastical 
charity organizations) sharply contrasted with the anti-immigration message of the 
government. The activities of volunteering civilians were covered quite significantly 
in social media and in the press.
The number of migrants kept growing during the summer and early autumn of 
2015, which also increased the scale of activities and public awareness of the grassroots 
organisations. Until the middle of September – when the closing of the borders was 
carried out through physical and legal means – aid was predominantly provided to 
migrants by volunteer civilians who believed that the absence of large established 
charity organisations during the summer was mainly politically motivated. However, 
established charity organisations held that the social work done on the streets by non-
professionals (mostly) was unprofessional and excessive in relation to the number 
of migrants. Established charity organisations argued that in order to avoid giving 
superfluous aid to migrants during the summer, they would not lend their complete 
help and only marginally took part in the relief work. These organisations started 
providing aid – with a targeted referral group and the help of substantial financial 
contributions from the government – after the migration route suddenly changed 
from the closed Serbian-Hungarian border towards Croatia. Meanwhile, the role of the 
grassroots organizations was greatly reduced. At this time, large numbers of migrants 
disappeared from the public areas of major cities partly due to the state-supported 
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transportation of migrants from the check-in point (the Croatian-Hungarian border) 
to the exit point (the Hungarian-Austrian border). This period lasted one month, 
from mid-September to mid-October, until the border fences were made ready at the 
Croatian border.
After the route of the migrants was modified to avoid Hungary, a small but 
dedicated cadre of the grassroots organisations and established charity organisations 
continued their charity work at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 in 
neighbouring countries, following the hubs of migrant movement in Greece and the 
Balkans. In 2016 some grassroots from Budapest, Debrecen and Szeged, individual 
volunteers again started providing partial aid to migrants who were starting to return 
to Hungary in smaller numbers. 
As for social media activity, the number of members of the Facebook groups of 
grassroots organisations markedly increased in June and July 2015. Until the reduction 
in the significant presence of migrants in Hungary, the larger groups, Segítsünk 
Együtt a Menekülteknek – Let’s Help the Refugees Together (SEM), and Migration Aid 
(MA), based their operations in Budapest and had an online membership of 10,000 
in closed Facebook groups that were established to help active members organize 
operational work. The open page of MA, which initiative was the easiest to join, and 
was designed to provide a floor for discussing pro-migrant opinions had amassed 
35,000 ‘likes’ within a few months. The closed operative groups tied to specific aid 
locations usually had a few thousand members: the closed groups dedicated to the 
three largest Budapest railway stations were MA Keleti (2,500 members), MA Nyugati 
(2,900 members) and MA Déli (1,200 members). One of the main MA bases outside 
Budapest was MA Debrecen (600 members). The largest grassroots group outside the 
capital, MigSzol Szeged, was founded at the end of June 2015 and had around 2,500 
members. Membership of the individual groups rose remarkably fast, despite the fact 
that there were overlaps between the groups.
Due to the lack of adequate and representative quantitative research we can only 
non-representative observations and information about the composition of the 
volunteers. Above all, it is important to note that the volunteers who spontaneously 
participated in providing aid to the migrants constituted a heterogeneous group. What 
is known is that there were more women among the volunteers, but the organisations’ 
leaders were mostly men. Nevertheless, a large number of volunteers were men and 
some women were represented among the leaders of volunteer organisations. The 
composition of the volunteers was variable according to age and education. However, 
some types of volunteers can be highlighted, such as students and teachers, and 
seniors or pensioners who had more free time due to the summer holidays or their 
activity status; also intellectuals and white-collar workers, and parents of small 
children who responded especially sensitively to the plight of refugee children. In 
summary, Hungarian society was widely represented among the volunteers. However, 
place of residence played a key role: not surprisingly, volunteers from the cities in 
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which help was needed were most numerous because the frequent (sometimes daily) 
provision of aid could only be undertaken by such ‘locals’.
Motivational structures of volunteers, and the ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ organizations
One of the most important research questions at both the organizational and individual 
level is what drove the volunteering activity. The motivation of an organization and 
individuals may be similar to some extent, but there are some drivers that are specific 
to organizations and individuals. Moreover, the motivations, drivers and perceptions 
of newly emergent grassroots organisations and established NGOs may be different, 
even though they work in the same field with the same target group. 
Internal commitment vs. bureaucratic ‘duty’ 
Based on our analysis of the interviews and focus groups a slight distinction can 
be identified between “institutional” or “official” actors, including large established 
charities (due to their ties to state as social service providers) and grassroots 
volunteers regarding their main perceptions of their role as volunteers. 
On the one hand, both members and experienced volunteers of official organisations 
believed that the provision of help involved both a personal commitment and a 
professional duty; a finding which is also revealed in their activities: a mixture of 
enthusiasm and following their own interests, but also a desire to operate according 
to specific rules and proven practices. Thus, the activity of larger, better-established 
relief organizations can be understood only if we take both factors into consideration. 
Many large charities and some NGOs were criticized for their low level of activity, or 
even absence from the field, especially in the first half of the refugee crisis in summer 
2015. This was often explained by others as the result of the substitution of inner 
motivation or commitment by political motivation, but the slow processes which are 
typical of hierarchically structured organisations may also have been responsible for 
the delayed response to the crisis. According to our interviewees, one of the charity 
organisations was not able to mobilize volunteers because of their lack of willingness 
to help migrants, while the recruitment of staff and the rapid collection and supply 
of donations was also difficult for some organizations. In sum, there are potentially 
several explanations why these established NGOs and charity organisations received 
so much criticism: perhaps their activities were indeed virtually invisible; they might 
have responded to the challenge too slowly; they may have provided little or no help at 
some stages of the crisis; there could have been a lack of capacity in terms of financial 
resources, staff, volunteers and donations; organisations may have looked after their 
own interests and been unable to identify a way to participate more effectively without 
harming their own organisations; alternatively, a simple lack of commitment may also 
have been responsible for their poor participation. 
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On the other hand, most of the charities and NGOs which were accused of 
insufficiently participating in the refugee crisis considered their own contribution 
as sufficient and adequate to the situation (saying that providing more donations 
and services would have led to an excess of donations, or that their involvement 
was proportionate to their capacity in terms of paid and volunteer staff availability, 
resources, mission, etc.). A few organizations admitted that they should have done 
more, but they also mentioned the financial or any infrastructural obstacles that had 
hindered them.
The newly formed, volunteer-based, and, initially, hierarchy-free organisations 
were quite successful regarding resource and volunteer mobilisation. According to our 
findings, the main reason for their success was the ‘low entry threshold’, meaning 
that volunteers had only to get to one of the train stations and could immediately 
join in the work, or by bringing some food as a donation they could also be considered 
‘active’. Members of these groups claimed that their involvement was a response to 
the lack of humanitarian aid provided by official organisations and that they were 
mainly motivated by their desire to help others. 
Besides commitment, the level of professionalism is also an important factor 
that may be used to sharply distinguish between the grassroots movements and the 
established charities and NGOs. The recurring question was whether the aid activities of 
the volunteers and their organisations were amateurish or professional. It would seem 
obvious that the established NGOs and charity organisations were the professional 
actors, while the new grassroots groups played the role of amateurs. However, the 
issue is not that clear-cut as individuals often moved between organisations. New 
NGOs were often founded or headed by professionals, and many active members were 
also social work professionals (or were engaged in other relevant fields), while aid-
related professionals often moved over to work at the new grassroots organisations 
because they felt they were ineffective at their old organisations. All in all, although 
social workers, medical specialists, interpreters and other relevant professionals were 
significantly represented in the activities of the amateur grassroots groups, these new 
initiatives basically remained amateurish, especially at the early stages of the crisis, 
due to the very nature of newly established grassroots organisations.
In contrast, professional charities were sometimes also accused of a lack of 
professionalism by members of the grassroots initiatives, typically in relation to 
technical issues relating to the distribution of donations in the field. Although these 
claims may be based on less objective observations, the uncertain and rapidly changing 
conditions might have decreased the professionalism of some of the established 
organisations.
These kinds of accusations from both sides may originate in the competitive 
situation at some localities where multiple organizations were simultaneously 
providing aid. The existence of a competitive attitude could implicitly be discerned in 
almost all the organizations, both the established and new grassroots groups, and also 
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within the two types of organizations.  This confrontation between ‘professional’ and 
the ‘layman’ approaches was the basis for many of the conflicts between the different 
types of organisations.
Individual motivational structures
Volunteer organisations clearly stressed that their main motivation was a desire to 
help for humanitarian reasons. However, at the individual level deeper analysis is 
necessary, but this was impossible to carry out based on our interviews. According to 
the main narratives of the volunteers we interviewed during our research effort, three 
types of motivational structure can be identified: altruistic, political and affected 
(Tóth-Kertész, 2016) (Table A1). These structures are not clearly defined categories 
(such as ideal types), but refer more to the main motivations for volunteering (i.e. 
there may have also been additional sources of motivation).
The main motivation of volunteers classified as altruistic was their ‘human’ desire 
to help, or feelings of pity for the refugees. They perceived asylum-seekers as an out-
group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) that they wanted to help because of their internal 
motivation. This group represents the traditional motivational structure (Czike 
& Bartal, 2006), and is mainly comprised of middle-aged women who had entered 
aid work as donors, and later came to do background or field work. In the field their 
relationship to asylum-seekers was characterized by a process of trust-building. In 
some cases, volunteers focused on specific groups (e.g. mothers, families, or Syrians) 
as they only wanted to help those in need (according to the volunteers’ presumptions 
of need). 
“With the first wave, we knew 100% that they were from Syria and Afghanistan, but 
later on many arrived from India and Pakistan too, where I do not believe are big problems 
and who I don’t think really need my help; I think they should go home” (female, 20, from 
Szeged, individual volunteer). 
In the second group, in which the volunteers are referred to as being predominantly 
politically motivated, volunteers were primarily motivated by a feeling of outrage at 
the official policy regarding migrants and asylum-seekers. Outrage is considered the 
main trigger for participation in collective action by many scholars (Castells, 2012). 
Previous to their relief work, these volunteers typically took a stand against the 
government’s communication, either online (e.g. sharing anti-government Facebook 
posts) or via political action (e.g. destroying government propaganda billboards). 
Among our interviewees, these volunteers generally took part in operative work 
such as coordinating volunteer groups or liaising with official institutions. Personal 
encounters with migrants were usually sporadic and focused on official processes, not 
individuals.
Therefore the main difference between the altruistic and the political motivational 
structure is in how the individuals perceived their collective activities. In general, 
altruistic types could best be described as ‘actual volunteers’ while members of the 
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politically motivated group were more likely to show the features of activists regarding 
their main emotions and their focus on politics (Eliasoph, 1998). However, in some 
cases it was not always clear whether the desire to help or the emotional outrage was 
stronger. 
“I wanted to show that our culture is helpful and that it protects people. I was raised 
religiously and it was thought in my family that we have to help. As for the billboard 
campaign, I was against it; I thought it was ‘not in my name’” (female, Budapest, 
individual volunteer). 
In the third group affected volunteers claimed that their main reason for helping was 
personal involvement on the basis of their own experience as migrants, or because 
they had family members in the sending countries. Unlike the altruistic group, they 
considered the asylum-seekers to be part of their in-group (Tajfel & Turner 1979). 
The volunteers in our sample whose main motivation was due to their being directly 
affected had no previous experience of volunteering. 
“Quite a lot of my fellow countrymen arrived, and I felt it was my duty to help” (male, 
51, Szeged, Syrian).
In their volunteer work they usually acted as interpreters because of their 
language skills; two of them, being medical workers, also helped with healthcare. 
These individuals believed that, among the volunteers, interpreters developed the 
closest relationships with the asylum-seekers as the common language provided a 
basis for trust-building. 
The borders were not always clear among the three motivational groups, as at the 
beginning of the refugee crisis volunteers were required to take part in a variety of 
types of work. More specialized positions were only developed later. We may presume 
that motivation (and skills) led the volunteers to fill the most fitting positions.
The above-described classification is not based on a large-scale sample; however, it 
may be considered a framework for better understanding the motivational structures 
of the target population, and can be used in further research. 
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Table 1 – Main motivation of individual volunteers
Motivational structures 1. Altruistic motivation 2. Political motivation 3. Affectedness
Main emotion(s) Solidarity Outrage Duty, sadness
Type of work
Donation, background 
work.
If needed: Fieldwork
Operative tasks, 
coordinating groups, 
communication with 
officials
Fieldwork: 
Interpreting, medical aid
Connection to 
migrants
Provision of aid
In fieldwork, the main 
motive is trust-building.
Ends with assistance
Less personal contact 
and experience because 
of the different types 
of work
Closest relationships
Multiple contacts – the 
main reason is language, 
trust is the main motive
Narrative Various Objective, reflecting Emotion-based
Source: Tóth & Kertész, 2016
Political involvement or neutrality?
The complex and debated political context around the refugee crisis and the aid 
work took a toll on every type of organisation: internal debates concerning political 
motivation or independence emerged in a manifest or latent way at many of the 
organisations whose members we interviewed. Regarding both the newly formed 
organisations and the established NGOs and charities, one of the main questions 
that arose during the refugee crisis was whether their motivation and activities were 
influenced by politics, whether individual or organizational, or by political actors. 
Most of the above-described actors (both institutions and informal groups) that 
took part in the humanitarian work denied being politically committed or having 
connections with any parties, thereby emphasizing their political neutrality or 
apolitical nature. However, not only the political and public discourse and the media 
but also the organizations themselves located each other on the political spectrum, 
identifying the political interest behind the others’ activities. Intense media scrutiny 
heightened presumptions about political affiliation. 
Official charity organisations were often described as being close to the state or 
the government because of their general activity, including the provision of social care 
that fulfilled state functions, leading to the natural accusation that these charities are 
political tools; moreover they were members of the state Charity Council. Accusations 
were also levelled against them because of their belated and small-scale involvement 
during the first half of the migration crisis. This claim became even stronger when, 
after the Serbian-Hungarian border was closed, only three charity organisations were 
allowed by the government to provide humanitarian aid at the entry point at the 
Croatian-Hungarian border, using state and European funds. 
Although the new grassroots organizations of volunteers were usually identified as 
oppositional actors (and an amendment to the asylum legislation further politicized 
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them by potentially criminalizing them as ‘human traffickers’ or ‘smugglers’; see Kallius, 
Monterescu, Rajaram 2016), this label cannot be extended to all volunteers, even 
though many of them acted due to some degree of (usually opposition-focused) political 
motivation. The activities of many others were based on solidarity or a feeling of being 
affected, as noted previously. One typical group of volunteers who took part in the relief 
work identified their activity as primarily humanitarian, with a focus on aid work, with 
political commitment remaining in the background. Nevertheless, the newly formed 
groups were criticized as being on the opposite side of the political spectrum, close to 
opposition parties, and even serving foreign interests. Within the “national” framework 
of the discussion about the refugee crisis that was represented by any actor with an anti-
refugee approach, the organisations and volunteers became framed as “anti-national” 
actors (Hunyadi, Juhász & Zgut, 2016) whose “pro-refugee” behaviour threatened the 
safety of the country. Therefore, volunteers were labelled as “guilty of high treason”, 
“Soros-agents” (referring to György Soros, the Hungarian-American businessman and 
founder of the Open Society Institutions), or even as “terrorists”. During our focus groups 
and interviews, the majority of the volunteers claimed to have experienced verbal or 
physical abuse from other Hungarians during their volunteering work.
On the organisational level, the political status of the new grassroots groups was 
unclear for many reasons and became even more complex because they were particularly 
exposed to the lures of the left-wing opposition (and in some cases, felt exposed to 
threats from the extreme right) simply because they were newborn and were acting, 
in effect, against the government. This situation necessarily led to internal debate 
about the political commitment of the organisations, as no principles had crystallized 
out about with whom (and whom not) to cooperate. These debates sometimes created 
tension as members had different ideas, political commitments and self- or group-
definitions. As mentioned previously, one of the main motivational narratives of 
the volunteers we interviewed was their personal political motivation, a fact which 
can be explained by the heavily politicized social context of the refugee crisis. Core 
members (“leaders” or “founders”) of the groups seem to have undergone a process 
of collective identity politicization as their new group identities took precedence 
over other collective identities (during the time of the refugee crisis), conflicts led 
to strong identification with the group, and volunteers described continuous power 
struggles with state officials and politicians (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). However, 
not all volunteers strongly identified with their groups, as they often switched roles 
and organisational frameworks during their relief work. Even those volunteers who 
underlined their outrage regarding the government’s politics of the time highlighted 
the humanitarian nature of their work and referred to it as “civil collective action” or 
“humanitarian aid”, but not as a movement. 
In order to answer the question of this chapter, we state that instead of getting 
involved in party politics or letting political actors influence the aid work, grassroots 
aimed to remain as neutral as possible. 
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This strategy of both formal and informal actors can be described as “politics-free-
politics”, which generally means party-free politics. During the migration crisis, similarly 
to with their previous experiences, civil actors seemed to presume that maintaining this 
distance served their cause, whereas – according to a study by Gerő & Kopper (2011) – 
this tendency to separate party politics and civil politics may actually weaken civil society. 
The use of online and social media 
During the summer and autumn of 2015 the refugee crisis was one of the main 
topics covered by the European media. Based on the commonly acknowledged power 
of social media and the online press, almost all the actors in the crisis (politicians, 
NGOs, charities, grassroots) used these channels in a very conscious way, and they 
also showed an example to other stakeholders of how to use such media in the future. 
All of the parties used the media according to their goals: the government, via its 
own media outlets, only gave voice to its own point of view, while the major media 
outlets, the online and offline press of the left-wing opposition, as well as the major 
commercial TV channels, presented the work of both the new and the established 
NGOs and organisations. The major aid organisations were initially absent from the 
media, but having received a barrage of criticism increased their media presence, 
while last but not least, the media was also effectively used by bellwethers among the 
refugees, who even demanded representation on occasion.
Social media, used at an intensity and with an effectiveness never witnessed before 
in Hungary during humanitarian activities, both by asylum seekers and helpers, played 
an eminent role during the crisis, and this was one of the most relevant lessons that 
Hungarian civil society learnt (For more on the role of online and social media in the 
refugee crisis in 2015, see Barta & Tóth, 2016; Bernáth & Messing, 2015). However, 
the very strong impact of online media and especially social media was no surprise 
at all: Hungarians themselves have never before had such a powerful influence on 
close-to-home contemporary events as they experienced during the emergence of 
such active and influential Facebook groups. 
Social media was first and foremost a tool in the volunteers’ hand. It had three 
main roles for volunteers and grassroots during the events of the refugee crisis. First 
of all, it was a tool for involvement: most of our interviewees joined the aid work 
through social media - either directly or indirectly (after being recommended by an 
acquaintance or visiting the fieldwork). Secondly, social media was an organisational 
tool as donation lists, work schedules, practical legal information etc. were available 
online. Finally, Facebook, through the groups’ official pages, represented a way of 
communicating with a larger audience. 
Considering the anti-refugee rhetoric of the Hungarian government, groups like Let’s 
help refugees together!, MigSzol Szeged, and Migration Aid can definitely be framed 
as communication platforms for those who disagreed with the official message of the 
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governing party. However, as regards the mobilising effects of social media, we must note 
that only in Debrecen did the volunteers organise themselves exclusively through social 
media, as the group’s core members had never met before engaging in this voluntary 
work. In the cases of Budapest and Szeged, core members and founders had been in 
contact before as they had been friends or co-workers for years. Therefore the early 
mobilising effects of social media should not be over-exaggerated, as the aid work was 
started by a small group of people. In Szeged the founders of the group had known each 
other well for years and most of them had previous volunteer or activist experiences. As 
their example, as well as the Budapest-based Migration Aid group appeared on the news, 
it motivated many others for whose mobilisation social media served as a great tool.
As for the involvement of the volunteers, our interviewees from the grassroots 
organisations often referred to their previous engagement with social media, such 
as sharing others posts or making statements about the refugee crisis. These earlier 
forms of engagement through social media can be described (using Morozov’s term) as 
“slacktivism”: online activism with little to no effect on actual events (Morozov, 2010), 
although it did later lead to commitment to humanitarian work and was thus the 
first step in becoming fully engaged. Why did people join the refugee relief work after 
sharing articles, photos or statements about the refugee crisis? One of the potential 
answers is that people strive for consistency in terms of their commitment, while 
society rewards consistency and condemns inconsistent behaviour (Cialdini, 2009). 
Accordingly, after being active on social media (i.e. visible to friends and acquaintances), 
people felt that in order to be consistent in their attitudes towards the refugee crisis, 
they had to volunteer. According to this finding we state that engagement to a cause 
through social media might be the first step of civic involvement, if the actors of that 
cause provide the possibility of joining their work.   
Conclusion
The flow of migrants who crossed Hungary prior to the summer of 2015 escalated 
to a level the country had never witnessed before. The rapidly rising number of 
asylum-seekers arrived in a country generally characterized by a low level of trust, 
solidarity and civil activity, as well as widespread xenophobia. These features were 
exploited by the government’s anti-immigration policies promoted by an intensive 
communication campaign that included the use of billboards with anti-immigration 
messages. As neither state institutions nor official charities or NGOs took a leading 
role in handling the refugee crisis - they remained inactive or hardly visible during the 
summer -, citizens formed their grassroots groups via Facebook in order to provide 
help for those in need.
In our study we examined the role of both official organisations, mainly large 
charities and self-organised, volunteering grassroots groups, the motivation of 
volunteers, the political context of their actions and briefly the role of social media. 
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According to our results, two main factors distinguished large established charity 
organisations and informal grassroots groups: the perception of their role and their 
different approaches. Volunteers of self-organised groups joined the aid work only 
because of their inner commitment. For the established NGOs and charities the 
nature of their motivation was in question: did it involve real inner commitment, 
or was it rather a kind of “red tape and going through the motions” process that 
drove the organizations? Our findings suggest that some of the large established 
organizations rather perceived their involvement more as a bureaucratic duty, but 
volunteers and some migrant-specific NGOs that joined the work were driven by their 
inner commitment as well. Established charities put down the refugee relief work as 
a planned process according to specific rules and criticized civilians because of their 
amateurish methods which resulted excessive donations to the migrants. On the other 
hand, civilians accused established charities for underperformance and criticised 
them for being absent from the field, especially during the summer. Charities justified 
their low involvement in different way than state institutions. State actors’ activity 
was in accordance with the Government’s anti-immigration policy, while charity 
organisations claimed that they did not wish to provide excess aid to the migrants 
(but that they had provided help in sufficient amounts as the migration flow had not 
reached the extent which would have required large-scale intervention). Civilians and 
volunteers claimed, however, that the invisibility of the large aid organizations may 
have been politically motivated. Similarly, volunteers’ actions have been also framed 
as politically motivated. 
Political involvement or neutrality was one of the main questions for all actors. On 
the individual level of motivations, we found three main motivational structures among 
volunteers that we labelled altruistic, political, and affected, which were differentiated 
by the main emphasized narrative. Volunteers with altruistic narratives joined the 
work mainly out of humanitarian reasons. Politically motivated volunteers were 
driven mainly by their political outrage, and affected volunteers were first or second 
generation immigrants, who felt involved because of their previous experiences. 
Even though political motivations played a role in many individuals involvement, we 
found that on the organisational level all charity organisations, NGOs and grassroots 
distanced themselves from political actors and parties, leading to rhetoric of “party-
free-politics”. The “fake-civil” discourse also emerged as volunteers were labelled 
“traitors of the country” or “Soros-agents” suggesting their hidden, external and 
political agendas for joining the work. Our findings suggest that both the “party-free-
politics” rhetoric and “fake civil” discourse weakened all the established NGOs, charity 
organisations and the self-organised groups themselves and encumbered cooperation 
between actors.
As for the role of the media, it was extraordinarily important in these grassroots 
movements. The inevitable role of social media, especially Facebook, was among the 
most important tools in the evolution of the movement as the grassroots groups 
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popped up on Facebook, as well as organized and promoted their daily activities 
using this site. The online press monitored the migration crisis, as well as the helping 
activity of the new grassroots initiatives, with growing intensity, and in doing so, 
contributed to the resupply of donations and new volunteers. Nevertheless, the 
media representation of the refugee crisis and of the grassroots movements was 
politically highly polarized. In any case, online media, alongside social media, played 
an extremely influential role, both from a pro and anti-migration perspective.
One of the main questions of our study was how new forms of solidarity could 
emerge in this social and political context. Apparently it was the complexity (or 
controversy) of the situation itself that had led to surprising outcomes. According to 
our results, the self-organised group’s success of mobilization can be traced back to 
three main factors. First, their “low-threshold” model provided that volunteers could 
join the work with low effort – e.g. by providing donations or stopping at one of the 
railway stations where the grassroots were present. Second, as the topic of migration 
was present within the political discourse from early spring 2015, a majority of the 
volunteers had made previous statements regarding the refugee crisis which they 
could stay consistent to by joining the aid work. Lastly, as all of the studied grassroots 
emerged during the summer of 2015, they had little to no organisational models, 
rules or self-definitions. Therefore volunteers could define their work according to 
their own beliefs, values, or political ideas. Volunteering had a simultaneous message 
of solidarity and political dissent, thus individuals with different motivations and 
goals could be involved in the same collective action. In contrary to previous research 
we state that volunteers were not necessarily social change activists: describing 
the volunteers and grassroots initiatives as purely oppositional actors might be 
misleading and might decrease the significance of solidarity as the main driver of 
their voluntarism. Conversely, the actions of volunteers and grassroots cannot all be 
traced back to solely humanitarian reasons. 
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Annex
Table A1 List of focus groups with grassroots members and number of individual interviews 
with volunteers
participants
date city gender age group
dominant 
educational 
attainment
total 
number of 
participants
focus group
men women
MigSzol 
Szeged
10.15. 
2015
Szeged 4 4
16–50 yrs 
old
tertiary 8
MA 
Debrecen
10.20. 
2015
Debrecen 1 5
30–40 yrs 
old
tertiary 6
MA
10.28. 
2015
Budapest 1 6
20–52 yrs 
old
tertiary 7
individual volunteer interviews
10.02-
12.22.2015
Szeged, 
Budapest
6 10
20–50 yrs 
old
tertiary 16
sum – – 12 25 – – 37
Table A2 List of organizations interviewed between October 2016 and January 2016
type of organization Name of organization
grassroots organizations of volunteers
Migration Aid (primary open and closed Facebook groups, 
plus subgroups related to the largest Budapest and Debre-
cen railway stations: MA Keleti, MA Nyugati, MA Déli, and 
MA Debrecen)
Let’s Help the Refugees Together (Segítsünk Együtt a Mene-
külteknek, SEM, Budapest)
MigSzol Szeged 1
established civilian and ecclesiastical 
NGOs which were already assisting 
refugees
Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
(Magyar Helsinki Bizottság)
Menedék – Migránsokat Segítő Egyesület 
(Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants)
Magyarországi Evangéliumi Testvérközösség – Oltalom 
Egyesület (Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship - Oltalom 
Charity Society)
Shelter Foundations (Menhely Alapítvány)
MigSzol Migrant Solidarity (MigSzol Migráns Szolidaritás)
Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Hungary 
(Magyarországi Evangélikus Egyház)
established large charity organizations
Hungarian Red Cross (Magyar Vöröskereszt)
Hungarian Maltese Charity Service
(Magyar Máltai Szeretetszolgálat)
Hungarian Interchurch Aid 
(Magyar Ökumenikus Segélyszervezet)
Hungarian Baptist Aid (Baptista Szeretetszolgálat)
1 The name of the grassroots organization ‘MigSzol (Szeged)’ is identical to that of the NGO ‘MigSzol Migrant Solidarity’ and 
means the same. Although there is a genuine connection between the groups, the similarity with names is only a coincidence.
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Table A3 Public events or discussions with the participation of organisations talking about 
their activity during the refugee crisis
event organizer date venue
participants 
(representatives of 
organizations)
Menedék 
Workshop2
Menedék – 
Hungarian 
Association for 
Migrants
20 October 2015 Gólya, Budapest
bishop of The 
Evangelical-
Lutheran Church in 
Hungary
Coffee to go, 
Migration: 
“Acceptance 
in this country 
and beyond our 
borders“3
Hungarian Maltese 
Charity
3 November 2015
Main office of 
Hungarian Maltese 
Charity, Budapest
leading 
representatives 
of Baptist Charity, 
Hungarian Maltese 
Charity; Hungarian 
Red Cross, Jesuit 
Refugee Service
“The man 
with tattoo – 
Immigration 
through the eyes of 
volunteers” – Ke-
leti Csoport (Keleti 
Group – volunteers 
of Migration Aid 
at Keleti Railway 
Station)4
Zöld Terasz (Green 
Terrace) and 
moderated by a 
member of Párbe-
széd Magyarorszá-
gért Párt (Dialogue 
for Hungary Party)
26 November 2015
Zöld Terasz, Bu-
dapest
Three leaders of 
the Keleti Group
Teszik? Teszik! Civil 
segítők a menekült-
válságban. Hanuka 
Proaktív series. (Do 
they act? They do 
act! Civilian actors 
as helpers in the 
refugee crisis.)5
Balint Jewish 
Community House 
(Bálint Zsidó Közös-
ségi Ház)
9 December 2015
Balint Jewish 
Community House 
(Bálint Zsidó Közös-
ségi Ház)
representatives 
of Migration Aid, 
MigSzol Szeged; 
Segítsünk Együtt 
a Menekültek-
nek (Helping 
the Refugees 
Together), and Me-
nedék – Hungarian 
Association for 
Migrants.
2 https://www.facebook.com/events/999756306746645/
3 https://www.facebook.com/events/1714923415394314/
4 https://www.facebook.com/events/1025431994174546/1033433036707775/
5 https://www.facebook.com/events/897929096961053/912454155508547/
